Downstreaming
Most of us have downstreamed light boat at some time or another. In busy barge fleets, it's standard operating procedure. But once or twice a year it ends in tragedy. In the 1990s so far, at least eleven towboaters have died in downstreaming accidents.
For you outsiders, what we're talking about is pointing the boat downstream and landing on the upstream end of a barge or other stationary object.You tread water backwards until you touch the barge, then hold the boat straight and face up.
If everything doesn't go just right, the stern can swing around in the current, pinning the boat sideways against the barge. Once that happens, the current can suck the boat under. It happens more often than you'd think. Here are some boats that sank while downstreaming in the 1990s alone:
Jackie Cenac, sunk in 1990, Mobile River, 1 death
Mary Burke, sunk in 1990, mile 174 UMR, 2 deaths
Betsy Diane, sunk in 1991, mile 849 LMR
Kelly Holston, sunk in 1991, mile 175 LMR
St. Jude, sunk in 1992, mile 151 LMR, 4 deaths
Miss Brandi, sunk in 1993, mile 133 LMR
Pat Salvaggio, sunk in 1993, mile 105 LMR
John F Walker, sunk in 1993, mile 175 UMR
Point Clear, sunk in 1993, mile 176 LMR
Julia T., sunk in 1994, mile 931 LMR
Louisiana, sunk in 1995, mile 119 LMR
Valley Sunshine, sunk in 1996, mile 177 UMR, 3 deaths
Perry Lobrano, sunk in 1996, mile 118 LMR
Mary Burke, sunk in 1997, mile 176 UMR, 1 death
Russell L Sanborn, sunk in 1997, mile 140 LMR
Bayou Black, sunk in 1997, mile 120 LMR
A record like that must give us pause. That's why the Downstreaming Quality Action Team (QAT) was formed last year -- to figure out what if anything should be done about it. The team included three towing company representatives and two Coast Guard officers. No towboat pilots, although two of the company people had wheelhouse experience.
The QAT studied the Coast Guard's accident database. For study purposes, they used computerized records of sinkings from 1992 through 1996. This wasn't as easy as it sounds. The database didn't have a separate category for downstreaming accidents. The team had to search through all the reports of towboat sinkings and identify which ones involved downstreaming. And they couldn't just have the computer search for the word "downstream," because Coast Guard investigators over the years did not know to write that in their reports.
The team found that there were 244 towboat sinkings on the inland waterways from 1992 to 1996. According to their research, eight of those sinkings were related to downstreaming. Most of the incidents were either in St. Louis or in the Baton Rouge to New Orleans area.
By the time the QAT finished gathering data, there were another 27 sinkings in the first three quarters of 1997. Three of those (in one month) were downstreaming-related.
The QAT report draws two conclusions from these numbers. First, downstreaming accidents are rare compared to the total number of sinkings. But the second part is more sobering: When a downstreaming does go wrong, "the risk to the vessel crew is very high and the options for escape are limited." In fact if you go back as far as 1982, there were 16 sinkings related to downstreaming. Just six of those sinkings resulted in 12 deaths. And in two of those incidents, the whole crew was lost.
All but one of the boats were 1350 horsepower or less. In some cases, investigators found that doors on the main deck were open, and/or there was not enough freeboard. In at least three cases there may have been some mechanical or electrical failure. Not surprisingly, speed of current was a factor. Most of the downstreaming incidents happened during relatively high river stages.
The QAT sent surveys to companies to find out their policies. Most didn't respond, but a few shared their thoughts. One company sent in an itemized list of downstreaming guidelines, including "#2 - Turn toward the bank first and round out with the head pointing out in the river," and ending with "#8 - Good Luck."
As deadly as downstreaming may be, the QAT report does not call for a ban; nor does it recommend any river stages or other factors as guidelines for when it's safe or unsafe to downstream. It does give this advice:
- Wheelhouse personnel should make sure "doors and windows" on the main deck are secured; notify crewmembers of intentions; and position them where they can "climb to safety" if necessary. Although the report doesn't say it, this means that no trip boat should ever downstream, unless you wake up the off-watch and have them stand ready to jump.The QAT developed a "decision tree" for deciding whether and how to downstream.
- Companies should support the judgment of pilots and not encourage them to downstream if they're not comfortable with it. In advance of high water, companies should consult with pilots and decide if downstreaming should be prohibited.
- The Coast Guard should instruct its field investigating units to recognize and record downstreaming accidents.
The report does not look at factors such as boat design (length?, flanking rudders?) and type of barges (empty rakes?). And the report can't show how many deaths occurred at companies where pilots are fired if they refuse to downstream. Someone else will have to do that.
Meanwhile, American Waterways Operators (the industry association) plans to produce a video showing the risks of downstreaming. The QAT report recommends that they get input from experienced pilots. Good idea. We know what it's like when currents turn awry.
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Where the River Runs Deep: the story of a Mississippi River pilot
by Joy J. Jackson
A personal history of Capt. Oliver Jackson, and a chronicle of navigation on the lower Mississippi River - from the 1790s to the 1980s.
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